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THE ADVANTAGES OF SOFT LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: 
THE ROLE OF UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, AND 
THE HAGUE CONFERENCE 
Henry Deeb Gabriel* 
INTRODUCTION 
n this Article, I suggest that the recent rise of nonbinding general 
principles (“soft law”) in international commercial law, such as the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) 
Principles of International Commercial Law1 and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Draft Legisla-
tive Guide on Secured Transactions,2 serves two important functions not 
met in treaties, conventions, or other positive law. 
Following a brief introduction to soft law principles, I discuss in Part II 
how nonbinding general principles can achieve the goal of uniform or, at 
least, harmonized law3 by providing general principles that can more eas-
                                                                                                             
 *  DeVan Daggett Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans. 
 1. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2004). 
 2. UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2008). 
 3. UNCITRAL notes the following distinction between harmonization and unifica-
tion: 
“Harmonization” and “unification” of the law of international trade refers to the 
process through which the law facilitating international commerce is created 
and adopted. International commerce may be hindered by factors such as the 
lack of a predictable governing law or out-of-date laws unsuited to commercial 
practice. [UNCITRAL] identifies such problems and then carefully crafts solu-
tions which are acceptable to States having different legal systems and levels of 
economic and social development. 
“Harmonization” may conceptually be thought of as the process through which 
domestic laws may be modified to enhance predictability in cross-border com-
mercial transactions. “Unification” may be seen as the adoption by States of a 
common legal standard governing particular aspects of international business 
transactions. A model law or a legislative guide is an example of a text which is 
drafted to harmonize domestic law, while a convention is an international in-
strument which is adopted by States for the unification of the law at an interna-
tional level. Texts resulting from the work of UNCITRAL include conventions, 
model laws, legal guides, legislative guides, rules, and practice notes. In prac-
tice, the two concepts are closely related. 
UNCITRAL, FAQ—Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral. 
org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html [hereinafter FAQ—UNCITRAL] (last visited Mar. 
27, 2009). This distinction is important because many, including myself, see true interna-
I 
656 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
ily accommodate various legal traditions. In addition, because of their 
nonbinding effect, they can accommodate local law. This flexibility pro-
vides an easier basis for adoption in a given court or arbitration because 
there is less conflict between the international and the domestic law 
compared to a binding convention. 
Second, as I discuss in Part III, because there is no need to have prin-
ciples adopted by a given jurisdiction, the principles are more easily and 
readily available for use. Since these principles are not binding, their 
likely effect is more to set norms instead of hard and fast rules, but this 
still achieves the salutary goal of creating broad international standards. 
The larger question posed is whether organizations such as UNIDROIT,4 
UNCITRAL,5 and the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
                                                                                                             
tional unification as a goal that may not be possible, given the different legal traditions in 
the world. Harmonization, on the other hand, is a much more reachable goal. 
 For a discussion of how Restatements in the United States have not brought about un-
iformity within the domestic law, see, for example, Kristen David Adams, Blaming the 
Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205 (2007); Kristen 
David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 423 (2004). 
 4. UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization seated in Rome. 
The purpose of UNIDROIT is to study the needs and methods for modernizing and har-
monizing private law, particularly commercial law, at the international level. UNIDROIT 
was created in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations. Following the demise 
of the League of Nations, UNIDROIT was reestablished in 1940 on the basis of a multila-
teral agreement. UNIDROIT: An Overview, http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/ 
main.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). This agreement is known as the UNIDROIT Sta-
tute, and the membership of UNIDROIT is restricted to States that have acceded to the 
statute. There are presently sixty-one Member States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy 
See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Para-
guay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. “The Institute is financed by annual contributions from its Member States,” with 
an additional annual contribution from the Italian Government. Id.; UNIDROIT: Mem-
bership, http://www.unidroit.org/english/members/main.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2009) 
As with other international organizations whose broad mandate is legal reform, 
UNIDROIT has tended to develop certain specializations in its work. UNIDROIT’s basic 
statutory objective is to prepare modern and, where appropriate, harmonized, uniform 
rules of private law, and to a great extent, it has eschewed work in public law. In addi-
tion, its uniform rules are generally concerned with substantive rules and not with the 
conflict of law principles that would supplement them or work independently of them. 
Over the years, UNIDROIT has drafted both hard law (conventions) and soft law (model 
laws and suggested principles). 
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(“Hague Conference”)6 should be spending their limited resources that 
come from their respective Member States to produce instruments other 
                                                                                                             
 5. A subsidiary body of the U.N. General Assembly, UNCITRAL was established in 
1966, under G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6396 (Dec. 17, 1966) and has a general 
mandate to harmonize and unify the law of international trade. Id. art I. 
From its founding, “UNCITRAL has since prepared a wide range of conventions, 
model laws and other instruments dealing with the substantive law that governs trade 
transactions or other aspects of business law which have an impact on international 
trade.” FAQ—UNCITRAL, supra note 1. A convention is a treaty that provides a set of 
international obligations that sovereign nations choose to undertake in their relations with 
one another. A model law is created as a suggested piece of domestic legislation. 
UNCITRAL is made up of sixty-one Member States from five regional groups. See 
General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law on Its Thirty-Seventh Session, ¶ 4, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/17 (June 14–15, 
2004). 
The current members of the Commission, elected on 16 October 2000 and 17 
November 2003, are the following States, whose term of office expires on the 
last day prior to the beginning of the annual session of the Commission in the 
year indicated: Algeria (2010), Argentina (2007), Australia (2010), Austria 
(2010), Belarus (2010), Belgium (2007), Benin (2007), Brazil (2007), Came-
roon (2007), Canada (2007), Chile (2007), China (2007), Colombia (2010), 
Croatia (2007), Czech Republic (2010), Ecuador (2010), Fiji (2010), France 
(2007), Gabon (2010), Germany (2007), Guatemala (2010), India (2010), Iran 
(Islamic Republic of) (2010), Israel (2010), Italy (2010), Japan (2007), Jordan 
(2007), Kenya (2010), Lebanon (2010), Lithuania (2007), Madagascar (2010), 
Mexico (2007), Mongolia (2010), Morocco (2007), Nigeria (2010), Pakistan 
(2010), Paraguay (2010), Poland (2010), Qatar (2007), Republic of Korea 
(2007), Russian Federation (2007), Rwanda (2007), Serbia and Montenegro 
(2010), Sierra Leone (2007), Singapore (2007), South Africa (2007), Spain 
(2010), Sri Lanka (2007), Sweden (2007), Switzerland (2010), Thailand (2010), 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2007), Tunisia (2007), Turkey 
(2007), Uganda (2010), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(2007), United States of America (2010), Uruguay (2007), Venezuela (2010) 
and Zimbabwe (2010). 
Id. “Members of the Commission are elected for terms of six years. The terms of half the 
members expire every three years.” FAQ—UNCITRAL, supra note 1. The UNCITRAL 
Secretariat presently consists of only nineteen people. There are eleven professional and 
eight administrative support staff. 
 6. There are presently sixty-nine Member States of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic 
of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Ma-
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than positive law. As I discuss in Part IV, I believe there are some specif-
ic uses of soft law that justify the allocation of resources to create soft 
law instruments. 
Although my analysis should apply to any governmental or nongo-
vernmental organization that produces soft law instruments, my particu-
lar concern is whether, given the limited resources available to the three 
international organizations most active in producing private international 
laws, UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference, these organ-
izations should be in the business of creating soft law. 
I. “SOFT LAW” 
Nonbinding legal principles are often referred to as “soft law.” Defined 
by one commentator, “‘soft law’ is understood as referring in general to 
instruments of normative nature with no legally binding force and which 
are applied only through voluntary acceptance.”7 Soft law is generally 
established legal rules that are not positive and therefore not judicially 
binding. The various soft law instruments in international commercial 
law include model laws,8 a codification of custom and usage promulgat-
ed by an international nongovernmental organization,9 the promulgation 
                                                                                                             
cedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. HCCH Members, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
 7. Michael Joachim Bonell, Soft Law and Party Autonomy: The Case of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, 51 LOY. L. REV. 229, 229 (2005). 
 8. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
(1985). The principle purpose of this instrument is to assist countries in reforming and 
modernizing their laws on arbitration. Id. art I(1). In this respect, the Model Law has been 
quite successful, and it has been enacted into law by a large number of jurisdictions, in-
cluding Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region of China, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, 
Macau Special Administrative Region of China, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, New Zeal-
and, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Scotland, Tunisia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and within the United States of 
America by the states of California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas. 
UNCITRAL, Status—1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_ 
status.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
 9. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) has promulgated 
the UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993) (ICC Publ’n. 
No. 500), which sets out the rules and principles that govern letters of credit. The ICC, 
founded in 1919 in Paris, is a federation of business organizations and business people. It 
is a nongovernmental body, and it is neither supervised nor subsidized by governments. 
What Is the ICC?, http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited, Mar. 27, 2009). 
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of international trade terms,10 model forms,11 contracts,12 restatements by 
leading scholars and experts,13 or international conventions.14 Although 
soft law principles do not begin as positive law, they can of course be-
come positive law either by courts, arbitral tribunals, or legislatures 
adopting them, or by transactional parties adopting them in their agree-
ments. Often they are drafted with the intent of becoming positive law in 
the future.15 
Of the three major international governmental organizations delegated 
the task of producing international commercial law instruments,16 two of 
the organizations, UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, have been quite active. 
These would include, for example, the UNIDROIT Principles on Interna-
tional Contracts and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.17 Both of these 
have been used extensively by tribunals as guidance. Recent examples of 
new soft law products include the UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of 
Transnational Civil Procedure and the new UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide to Secured Transactions.18 Unlike UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, 
                                                                                                             
 10. See, e.g., the 2000 ICC, International Commercial Terms (“INCOTERMS”). “The 
ICC introduced the first version of [INCOTERMS] in 1936.” Since then, they have ac-
quired tremendous popularity and are the standard trade definitions universally used in 
international sales contracts. International Chamber of Commerce, Understanding Inco-
terms, http://www.iccwbo.org/incoterms/id3042/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
 11. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MODEL CLAUSES FOR USE IN CONTRACTS 
INVOLVING TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS (1998). 
 12. The Grain and Free Trade Association has more than eighty contracts covering 
cost, insurance, and freight, “free on board,” and delivered terms. GAFTA Contract, 
http://gafta.com/index.php?page=contracts (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
 13. See, e.g., UNDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
(2004); UNDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994). 
 14. For a discussion of the appropriate use of each of these types of soft law instru-
ments, see Roy Goode, Reflections on the Harmonisation of Commercial Law, 1991-I 
UNIF. L. REV. 54 o.s. (1991). 
 15. For example, this is the case with the COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, 
EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (1998). 
 16. There are, of course, many organizations that create private international law. For 
example, within the United Nations itself, these include the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development and the U.N.  Economic Commissions for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, 
Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as specialized agencies of the 
United Nations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, the International Maritime Organisation, and 
the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
 17. G.A. Res. 31/98 (Dec. 15, 1967). 
 18. UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ali-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf; U.N. 
Com’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Security Interests: Recommendations of the 
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the third organization, the Hague Conference, has not historically pro-
duced soft law texts. 
Because of their long involvement in specialized trade issues, other 
private organizations, such as the ICC, have a long history of drafting 
very successful soft law documents. In the case of the ICC, this would 
include the highly influential INCOTERMS, governing shipping terms, 
and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, govern-
ing letters of credit.19 
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF HARMONIZATION IS NOT PRESENT IN CREATING 
SOFT LAW 
Harmonization of positive law has some inherent difficulties that do 
not arise in the creation of soft law. The list of challenges offered in this 
Section is not meant to be exhaustive; however, it does set forth the ma-
jor concerns and difficulties that drafters of positive law will confront in 
their efforts to harmonize the law among different legal systems in inter-
national commercial law. 
In an ideal world, the drafters of both international and domestic laws 
would take the best features of several bodies of law and meld them into 
a comprehensive legislative scheme. The world is not ideal, however, 
and attempts to harmonize, though successful in many cases, often run 
into obstacles such as differences in commercial practices as well as dif-
ferences in legal theory and legal policies.20 As I see it, there are four 
major challenges to harmonization that may be mitigated by soft law. 
                                                                                                             
UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/631 
(Mar. 16, 2007). 
 19. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMEN-
TARY CREDITS (1993) (ICC Publ’n No. 500) 
 20. Thus, after twelve years of work revising the American Uniform Commercial 
Code, the fruits of attempting to harmonize the Uniform Commercial Code with the Con-
vention on the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) were reduced to the following prefa-
tory comment: 
When the parties enter into an agreement for the international sale of goods, 
because the United States is a party to the [CISG], the convention may be the 
applicable law. Since many of the provisions of the CISG appear quite similar 
to provisions in Article 2, the committee drafting the amendments considered 
making references in the Official Comments toprovisions in the CISG. Howev-
er, upon reflection, it was decided that this would not be done because the in-
clusion of such references might suggest a greater similarity between the Ar-
ticle 2 and the CISG than in fact exists. 
U.C.C. REVISED ART. 2, 2003 prefatory note (amended 2003 & 2005).  
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A. The Mandate 
Generally, drafters of any statute or convention will be given a specific 
mandate for change. Although the mandate may include harmonization 
with other law, the mandate will inevitably also include modernizing ex-
isting law to suit contemporary business practices as well as correcting or 
clarifying ambiguities and mistakes that have arisen in the current law. 
Harmonization will be a minor part of the mandate; the major pressure is 
to keep existing law, to the extent possible, consistent with the mandate 
for change, and the subsidiary goal of harmonization is often greatly mi-
nimized in the drafting process. 
This is likely to be exacerbated when an existing statute or code is be-
ing revised, as contrasted with the creation of a new convention or treaty. 
When the drafters confront the actual and perceived problems of an ex-
isting convention, the focus tends to be inward looking, and the focus is 
on the pre-existing convention. This draws attention away from the goal 
of harmonization. To the extent that the revision is designed to update 
the law for purposes of changing business practices or social goals, the 
goal of harmonization may well lose out to the goal of modernizing the 
law. 
It is also often the case that those tasked with the revisions bring to the 
process expertise in the laws being revised, but have no particular exper-
tise in the other laws with which the revisions are to be harmonized. In 
this case, attempts for harmonization quickly get lost in the process. 
This is not the case in the drafting of a soft law instrument because 
prior law does not confine the final product. Thus, for example, given the 
freedom to create a new soft law legal instrument, drafters of the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Law sought to draft 
the best law possible based on actual commercial practices, without the 
restraint of an existing international or domestic law guiding their work. 
B. Harmonization Is Difficult to Achieve Among Different Legal Tradi-
tions 
The harmonization of international legal rules needs to take into ac-
count the globalization of trade and economies. To the extent that this 
crosses different legal traditions, harmonization efforts are more difficult 
because of the differences both among the various legal traditions as well 
as among languages.21 
                                                                                                             
 21. For a general discussion of the incompatibility issues in attempting to reconcile 
domestic and international law, see Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability of the United 
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods as a Model for the Revision of 
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1995 (1998). 
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Although there have been many successful efforts to harmonize inter-
national commercial law, this success has largely been due to the fact 
that its principles have only to be compatible with international commer-
cial practice, not with domestic laws based on civil law or common law 
traditions.22 
Yet, when the process of crafting international legal rules begins, there 
is great pressure by the drafters to conform the international rules to their 
respective domestic laws. In this process, something has to be compro-
mised, particularly when the drafters are coming from wholly different 
legal traditions. Either the international rules will not conform to the do-
mestic rules, or the domestic rules will have to be redrafted to conform to 
emerging international law. The latter is rarely desired or achieved. Even 
if the goal of harmonization with other international or domestic legal 
systems is articulated, there is less incentive to make fundamental 
changes in one’s domestic law to achieve this goal.23 Moreover, to the 
extent that the law being revised is, or is based upon, the law of contract 
or property, the basic concepts and terms are not compatible. In addition, 
basic legal principles tend to work as a unified whole; thus, to selectively 
borrow a contract or property principle from another legal system runs 
the risk of destroying the balance and interplay with other rules. 
This problem is greatly diminished with soft law principles in interna-
tional commercial law because no domestic legal rules need to be ac-
commodated.24 There are also numerous examples of soft law instru-
ments that straddle the civil law and common law traditions.25 
C. Harmonizing Existing Laws Is Difficult If the Scope of the Laws Dif-
fers 
It is easier to harmonize laws when the laws being compared have the 
same scope. To the extent that a given statute or code provides unified 
coverage of a given area of the law or is part of a broader unified code, 
there is likely to be an internally consistent structure in the law that will 
make harmonization with other law difficult if the other law does not 
                                                                                                             
 22. An obvious exception is the CISG. The CISG successfully straddles both the 
common law and the civil law, and avoids grappling with the major distinctions between 
the two. See HENRY DEEB GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON 
OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2d ed. 2009). 
 23. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 2003. 
 24. I am assuming that the law of the enforcing jurisdiction or applicable arbitration 
tribunal will provide for the application of the soft law principles under choice of law 
rules. This would appear to be the case in the United States, for example. See U.C.C. § 1-
301, cmt. 2 (2008). 
 25. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 2004. 
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have the same scope.26 Soft law instruments do not have this limitation 
because they are not attempts to replicate an existing law or legal struc-
ture. 
D. The Advantages of Soft Law Instruments as a Means to Harmoniza-
tion of the Law 
As discussed above, soft law instruments are not subject to the same 
pressure to be harmonized with existing law, as is the case with treaties, 
conventions, and other sources of positive law. Moreover, in the case of 
soft law instruments, it is not necessary to attempt to harmonize the en-
tire area of law, and therefore it is easy to pick the provisions out of 
another law that fit a specific need in the law being drafted for selective 
harmonization. Selective borrowing also lends itself to borrowing from 
various sources. This process of picking and choosing affords systematic 
reflection on what should be the best result, not simply a possible result, 
for the issue being considered. 
Because treaties and conventions must be fashioned in a way that en-
courages adoption by various States, in order to create a high comfort 
level with the appropriateness of the instrument, there is a strong tenden-
cy toward the creation of instruments that will reflect the legal traditions 
of the potential adopting States. This inevitably results in an attempt to 
reconcile the differing legal traditions. It creates problems in terms of 
both the time necessary to finish the instrument as well as the actual sub-
stance of the resulting convention. 
Preparation of international commercial law conventions and treaties 
tends to be a long process, and the long length of time is partially attri-
butable to incessantly searching for common principles and reconciling 
established principles from different legal systems and traditions. This 
need was in large part the reason why the CISG took over ten years to 
prepare.27 
Moreover, and more importantly, the need to accommodate specific 
legal traditions locks the drafters into a straightjacket of limited possibili-
ties that often prevents the examination of the best solution. This is often 
politically driven. For example, the late Professor Allan Farnsworth, who 
served as an American delegate for the CISG and as a member of the 
working group for the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commer-
                                                                                                             
 26. Id. at 2006. 
 27. G.A. Res. 35/51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/51 (Dec. 4, 1980). See also UNCITRAL, 
1980—United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980 
CISG.html. 
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cial Contracts, characterized the work leading to these two instruments as 
follows: “While the atmosphere in UNCITRAL was political (because 
delegates represented governments, which were grouped in regional 
blocs), that in UNIDROIT was apolitical (because participants appeared 
in their private capacity).”28 For this reason, the UNIDROIT Principles 
are viewed as “neutral” contract law principles in that they reflect a bal-
ance of interests and have not been formulated by any government. 
III. THE LACK OF A NEED FOR RATIFICATION AS AN ADVANTAGE OF 
SOFT LAW 
Once completed, a soft law instrument is ready for adoption by the par-
ties as part of their agreement or ready for use as an interpretive docu-
ment by courts and arbitrators. Soft law instruments, unlike treaties and 
conventions, are not subject to the lengthy process of ratification that can 
delay enforcement for years.29 For example, one of the most successful 
international conventions in recent times, the U.N. Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York 
Convention”), was completed in 1958, but not ratified by the United 
States until 1970.30 Moreover, although the New York Convention has 
been very successful, this has not been the case with many recent inter-
national commercial law conventions.31 In a federal system, such as the 
United States, Canada, or Mexico, ratification often entails complicated 
political maneuvering between the federal government and the state or 
provincial governments.32  
                                                                                                             
 28. E. Allan Farnsworth, The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles, 72 
TUL. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (1998) (citations omitted). 
 29. This can be the case with domestic law as well. For example, four years following 
a thirteen-year revision of the sales provisions of the American Uniform Commercial 
Code, no state has yet adopted the new law. 
 30. UNCITRAL, Status, 1958—Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
NYConvention_status.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2009) 
 31. See Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International Commercial 
Law, 23 J.L. & COM. 117, 153–55 (2004). Gopalan provides a detailed breakdown of the 
relative success of various conventions based on their ratification. Generally, many con-
ventions passed since the 1964 Convention Related to a Uniformed Law on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods have been ratified by only a handful of States. Id. The few excep-
tions to this pattern include “[t]he 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards[,] . . . perhaps the most successful convention ever with 134 
ratifications[,] . . . [and t]he 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods[,] . . . ratified by sixty-two countries.” Id. at 155.  
 32. Obviously a similar problem exists between the European Union and its Member 
States. 
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In the case of a treaty or convention, there is a strong desire by adopt-
ing jurisdictions to produce a treaty or convention consistent with the 
domestic law of the jurisdiction.33 There is not a concomitant pressure to 
harmonize soft law instruments with domestic law because there is no 
need to ratify the soft law instrument, and therefore no need to justify it 
in relation to existing laws.34 
It has been suggested that soft law instruments, such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, have been successful 
precisely because they are not binding, have not been influenced by 
governments and do not pose any threat to national legal systems. Like 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration they are designed to be a 
unifying influence and a resource, but it is left to legislatures, courts 
and arbitral tribunals to decide to what extent they assist in the solution 
of problems.35 
IV. THE USES OF SOFT LAW INSTRUMENTS 
Soft law may have advantages over positive law instruments in terms 
of both harmonization as well as the lack of a need for ratification. But 
unless the soft law instruments themselves produce benefits beyond 
those derived from positive law, there would still be the question of 
whether they justify expenditure of limited resources. I believe that there 
are in fact important practical uses of soft law that justify the efforts and 
resources necessary to produce them, and I outline these uses below. 
A. The Basis for Further Work 
Some soft laws, such as model laws, are specifically intended to be the 
basis for adoption by individual jurisdictions,36 and many have been most 
                                                                                                             
 33. See, e.g., Henry Gabriel, The Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code—How 
Successful Has It Been?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 653, 654 (2001) (comparing the structure and 
content of the UCC to the Uniformed Electronic Transactions Act to argue that it is pre-
ferable to introduce state, rather than federal, legislation to promote universal commercial 
legal principles in the fifty U.S. states). 
 34. This is not to say that various domestic or other international laws will not have a 
strong influence on soft law principles. For example, the UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
national Commercial Law were influenced by the laws of Algeria, Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United States, among other sources. See Sandeep Gopalan, The 
Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereingty Felled?, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
267, 319–20 (2004).  
 35.  Gopalan, supra note 31, at 159 & n.188 (citing Roy Goode, Communication on 
European Contract Law, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/ 
fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/5.6.pdf). 
 36. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, or legislation 
based on it, has been adopted in Australia, Bermuda, Colombia, France, Hong Kong Spe-
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successful in setting international and domestic standards for legisla-
tion.37 Nonetheless, model laws intended to be adopted as drafted or with 
minor revisions are often subject to the same political pressures of har-
monization and the same need to conform to specific legal traditions as a 
treaty or a convention. Because the drafters of model law have the same 
concerns of ratification and coordination as drafters of domestic law, 
many model laws determined to be well drafted, such as the Model Law 
on Electronic Commerce, have been used for domestic legislation.38 
Moreover, model laws can be used as a template for related legislation. 
Thus, for example, the Model Law of Electronic Commerce was a source 
for the American Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, the Canadian 
Uniform Electronic Commerce Act, and the Australian Electronic Trans-
actions Act.39 
                                                                                                             
cial Administrative Region of China, Ireland, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singa-
pore, Slovenia, the States of Jersey (Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland) and, within the United States of America, the State of Illi-
nois. 
The countries that have implemented legislation influenced by the UNCITRAL Mod-
el Law on Electronic Commerce and the Principles include Canada and the United States. 
The Uniform Electronic Commerce Act was adopted in 1999 by the Uniform Law Confe-
rence of Canada, and enacted as federal Canadian legislation and Saskatchewan, Manito-
ba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Yukon. The U.S. legislation, the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act, was adopted in 1999 by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law, and has been enacted in the following states: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. UNCITRAL, 
Status, 1996—UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html [hereinafter Status—
Model Law on Electronic Commerce] (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
 37. Of course, sometimes actual conventions can be useful for setting international 
commercial standards for further conventions. This was clearly the case with the 1964 
UNIDROIT Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 
which was the basis for UNCITRAL’s CISG. 
 38. Status—Model Law on Electronic Commerce, supra note 36. 
 39. For a discussion on the history and development of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
of Electronic Commerce as well as its influence on and differences from the American 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, see Henry Gabriel, The New United States Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act: Substantive Provisions, Drafting History, and Comparison 
to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 54 UNIF. L. REV. 652 (2000). For 
a discussion on the influence of the Model Law of Electronic Commerce on Canadian 
and Australian legislation, see Henry Gabriel, Fear of the Unknown: The Need to Provide 
Special Protections in International Electronic Commerce, 50 LOY. L. REV. 307 (2004). 
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On the other hand, statements of principles such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the UNIDROIT/Amer-
ican Law Institute Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, and the 
many American Law Institute Restatements of the Law have all been 
drafted without the express purpose of adoption and therefore are not 
drafted with the attendant structural limitations. As a result, they have 
frequently achieved a neutrality and balance that would not otherwise be 
possible. Once completed, model laws have often taken on a great influ-
ence and significance in the further development of positive law. This 
can occur simply because they are a convenient and ready source of law 
and therefore eliminate the difficulty of drafting new language.40 
There can also be a more conscious adoption because it is thought that 
they represent the correct result. This would appear to be the case with 
the recent promulgation by the Organization for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa of a new Uniform Law on Contracts, which is 
based on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts. 41 
Of course, some of the most successful soft law instruments, such as 
the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits and 
INCOTERMS, were specifically drafted for use by a large number of 
contracting parties because they reflect common, well-established busi-
ness practices; for this reason they are the de facto legal standards for the 
transactions they govern. Thus, although not designed as models for fur-
ther legislation, they have in fact become such. For example, this is the 
case with the letter of credit provisions of the American Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which draws heavily from the Uniform Customs and Prac-
tice for Documentary Credits.42 
Private organizations, particularly trade organizations, have a strong 
financial incentive to produce soft law instruments that benefit their con-
stituencies. It has been questioned whether governmental organizations, 
especially international organizations, should be spending limited re-
                                                                                                             
 40. Describing the influence of the American Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts on the drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
national Contracts, the late Professor E. Allan Farnsworth noted that unlike any other 
common lawyer, “I came with texts in statutory form: the Uniform Commercial Code and 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. No decision of a common law tribunal—not even 
the House of Lords—was as persuasive as a bit of blackletter text.” Farnsworth, supra 
note 28, at 1990 (italics omitted). 
 41. Preparation by UNIDROIT of a Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law, 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/legalcooperation/ohada.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). 
 42. Katherine Barski, Comment, Letters of Credit: A Comparison of Article 5 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits, 41 LOY. L. REV. 735, 738 (1996). 
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sources on developing tools other than legislation intended for enact-
ment. This critique, however, often does not take into consideration that 
by providing a template for possible legislation, model laws and restate-
ments save the respective government the cost of having to produce a 
similar piece of legislation from scratch. 
B. Guidance to Tribunals 
Soft law instruments, such as principles and restatements, have been 
widely used by courts and arbitrations as a basis for forging new legal 
rules as well as interpreting existing ones. In the common law world, 
particularly the United States, courts have long relied upon as a source of 
law the various Restatements of the Law produced by the American Law 
Institute.43 Moreover, arbitration tribunals, which are generally not bound 
by domestic choice of law restrictions, often adopt legal rules, such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Law, because of 
the presumed neutrality of these rules.44 
Moreover, soft law is often a basis for gap fillers when the otherwise 
applicable international or domestic law does not address a specific ques-
tion. For example, as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Com-
mercial Law have a broader scope than the CISG, the Principles have 
been used to resolve questions not addressed by the CISG.45 
Whether this guidance is always useful may be questioned because, 
with the convenience of having existing rules in place, according to 
some, tribunals have a tendency to follow soft law principles blindly 
without any analysis of why the rules are appropriate or better suited for 
the issue than competing rules.46 However, to the extent that the prin-
ciples were drafted carefully and thoughtfully, this concern should be 
minimal. The courts, in effect, are likely to stumble upon the best rule. 
                                                                                                             
 43. See generally Kristen David Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice Cardo-
zo’s Ministry of Justice?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 173 (2007) (noting Justice Cardozo’s support 
for the Restatements published by the American Law Institute). 
 44. MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW 
208–09 (3d ed. 2005). 
 45. See, e.g., Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf Int’l Ltd., [2004] 2000 N.Z.C.A. 350 
(C.A.); SCEA GAEC Des Beauches Bernard Bruno v. Société Teso Ten Elsen GmbH & 
COKG, Cour d’appel [CA] Gernoble, Oct. 23, 1996, available at http://www.unilex.info/ 
case.cfm?pid=2&id=638&do=case. 
 46. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
and the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 512 (1998); 
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A 
Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1269 (1997). 
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C. Party Autonomy and Neutrality 
Within the limits provided by choice of law rules and party autonomy, 
parties may choose to adopt specific rules embodied in nonbinding in-
struments. Some instruments, such as the Uniform Customs and Practice 
for Documentary Credits or the INCOTERMS,47 are so commonly used 
and accepted that they often govern by default absent a contrary party 
agreement. Most soft law instruments, however, become a part of the 
parties’ agreement by express or implicit adoption. 
The parties may choose to do so because they believe the rules reflect 
their business relationship better than domestic or other international law 
or they seek a neutral principle that does not give one party an advantage. 
Between parties of unequal bargaining power, the stronger party may 
insist on the choice of its own domestic law. However, there are times 
when a party, although having sufficient bargaining power to impose its 
own domestic law, in practice prefers not to because of its own law’s 
lack of predictability or for another reason, and instead opts for other 
governing law such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts.48 
V. CAUTIONARY CONCERNS OF SOFT LAW INSTRUMENTS 
There are two specific drawbacks to soft law instruments. First is the 
inability to meet the need for certainty of enforcement, and second is the 
concern that they have not been tested in the political process. 
A. The Need for Certainty of Enforceability 
In some areas of international commercial law, certainty of the law and 
the enforcement of the specific rules is a necessity. Because international 
                                                                                                             
 47. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS (2000) (ICC Publ’n No. 560). 
 48. For instance, as pointed out by the President of the International Court of Arbitra-
tion of the Russian Federation, Alexander S. Komarov: 
[One] reason which may militate in favour of the wide use of the [UNIDROIT] 
Principles [in Russia] is the fact that Russian lawyers and business people do 
not seem to be as reluctant as their foreign counterparts to contemplate refer-
ences to the Principles in place of the application of their domestic law on the 
ground that the former would not confer on them the advantages which parties 
to foreign trade contracts usually expect from the application of their own do-
mestic law, namely the well-known and detailed regulation of business transac-
tions to which they are accustomed. 
Alexander S. Komarov, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts: A Russian View, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 247, 250 (1996). 
670 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
conventions are binding, once they are ratified they have the advantage 
of instant uniformity and enforceability. 
Thus, for example, the recent Cape Town Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment49 and the accompanying Protocol to the 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters 
Specific to Aircraft Equipment50 give an enforceable basis for the se-
cured financing of aircraft in the international market; it would be unrea-
sonable to expect the international financing of multimillion dollar air-
craft without the level of certainty and protection afforded parties by a 
clear, black letter, enforceable convention.51 
An agreement to use a particular set of rules is not self-enforcing, but 
needs some domestic law to provide a basis for its enforcement.52 This, 
in many circumstances, leads to uncertainty because the parties may not 
know in advance whether the governing terms of the agreement will be 
enforced according to their express wishes. However, this problem 
should not be overstated. A large proportion of international legal dis-
putes are resolved in arbitration, and generally the party’s choice of law 
will control in arbitration irrespective of the underlying substantive do-
mestic law. Moreover, absent some direct conflict with domestic policy, 
most domestic laws provide for a strong rule of party autonomy. 
                                                                                                             
 49. Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 2001), 
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm. 
 50. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town, 2001), available at http://www. 
unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm#NR2. 
 51. For a discussion of the history of the Convention and the need for certainty in this 
area of international finance, see Sandeep Gopalan, Harmonization of Commercial Law: 
Lessons from the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 
9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 255 (2003). 
 52. Domestic courts are obligated to apply their own national law, including the rele-
vant conflict of law rules. Under the traditional and prevailing view, the choice of law 
applicable to international agreements is limited to the particular domestic law. This is 
the position of the European Union under the 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations, Jun. 19, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1993), which unifies the conflict 
of law rules for contracts within its Member States. Thus, even if parties expressly refer 
to soft law principles or rules as the law that governs their agreement, domestic courts are 
likely to conclude that soft law principles are incorporated into the contract. The law of 
the contract will therefore have to be determined separately on the basis of the conflict of 
law rules of the forum, and the incorporated terms will bind the parties only to the extent 
that they do not affect the domestic rules of law from which the parties may not derogate. 
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B. Untested in the Political Process of Adoption 
With the drafting of conventions and treaties, political forces strongly 
influence the process at two stages. First, this occurs during the drafting 
process. Second, this occurs during the ratification process. 
During the drafting, representative governments have a strong sense of 
what is in their best interests, and these interests will be strongly debated 
and lobbied for during the drafting process. Moreover, it is common in 
organizations, such as UNCITRAL, to have wide representation by in-
dustry and business organizations that will also press their concerns. 
This process of vetting, compromise, and ultimate acceptance usually 
yields instruments acceptable to the various constituencies and, therefore, 
they are likely to result in a wide acceptance. This may not be the case 
with soft law instruments, which may have evolved through a more insu-
lar process. Moreover, conventions and treaties tend to reflect practical, 
specific problems that call for fact-specific rules, as opposed to abstract 
principles, and thus may be easier to apply and lend more certainty and 
less divergence in interpretation. 
However, because of the various compromises for acceptable results, a 
convention may not reflect best practices but merely acceptable practic-
es. In addition, they may lend themselves to a less flexible cherry-
picking of rules. Moreover, irrespective of the proposed convention’s 
quality, unless it is adopted, it has no force. That of course presupposes 
that the various constituencies do not bring the project to a standstill be-
cause of an inability of the various stakeholders to agree upon a final text 
at all. 
CONCLUSION 
This brings us back to our original question. Given the limited finan-
cial and human resources available to UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and the 
Hague Conference, should these organizations be in the business of pro-
ducing soft law? This Article argues that they should. Given the in-
creased globalization of the world economy, the development of interna-
tional commercial law has had an exponential growth. For the reasons 
discussed in this Article, soft law has been an important part of this de-
velopment. 
The former Secretary General of UNIDROIT, Professor Herbert 
Kronke, recently addressed the question of whether it should be within 
the domain of government-financed international organizations to pro-
duce soft law instruments rather than concentrating solely on the produc-
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tion of specific conventions that confront specific problems.53 He con-
cludes, I think properly, that the answer should not be an all-or-nothing 
proposition. Instead, there is a proper role for both soft law and binding 
conventions in the development of international commercial law. There 
are advantages to both. 
                                                                                                             
 53. See Herbert Kronke, Methodical Freedom and Organizational Constraints in the 
Development of Transnational Commercial Law, 51 LOY. L. REV. 287, 293–94 (2005). 
Kronke observes that 
[m]uch has recently been written about the “new” transnational commercial 
law, consisting of fact-specific rules, having taken over from the “old” law, 
consisting all too often of highly abstract standards, which are constantly in 
need of interpretation and are, therefore, threatened by erosion. Assuming that 
is correct, would it then not be a disservice to the constituencies of transnation-
al commercial law to continue producing international instruments such as the 
UNIDROIT Contract Principles? As a result, should we not then concentrate all 
resources on narrow problem areas resolving those specific problems by prac-
tice-driven drafting of instruments such as the Cape Town Convention or the 
[U.N.] Receivables Financing Convention? 
The answer is “no” if the question were to suggest a radical “either-or” choice. 
For example, it is true that governments would be well-advised not to again 
discuss the concept of good faith in the context of developing rules for a specif-
ic transaction as they did in Vienna where they finally settled on papering over 
disagreements in article 7 CISG. We can make this assertion only now that we 
have discovered an alternative vehicle for the promotion of that concept: article 
1.7 UNIDROIT Contract Principles. While it is equally true that a maxim of in-
terpretation in good faith would sit awkwardly in the Cape Town Convention 
today, it would not today be used as an overarching and abstract principle on 
interpretation of any sophisticated domestic law concerning the taking of colla-
teral either. Rather, it would be broken down into specific, mostly judge-made 
rules regarding the protection of the security provider or the lessee in specific 
circumstances. 
In other words, standards have not become irrelevant. They have found their 
proper, yet different, place within the widened spectrum of types of interna-
tional instrument. In an ongoing intellectual exchange with academic debate 
and business, the intergovernmental organizations were able to identify their 
proper role and designate their proper place thanks to the freedom granted by 
governments. 
Id. 
